



**Asian Development Bank - International Initiative for Impact Evaluation**

**Video Lecture Series**

# **Impact evaluation for democracy and governance**

Annette N. Brown


# Lecture objectives



- Demonstrate that impact evaluation methods can be used in the democracy and governance sector
- Provide new examples of different impact evaluation methods in practice

Do democratic processes  
lead to better governance  
outcomes?

# Theory of change



Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov  
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6133  
July 2012

# **DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM AFGHANISTAN**

- Afghanistan 2007-2008
- Component of the National Solidarity Program (NSP)
  - Creation of Community Development Council (CDC)
  - Disbursement of block grants for village projects
- Proposals, selection, prioritisation

# Field experiment



- Randomly assigned villages to two selection processes
  - Consultation meeting
  - Referendum
- Cluster RCT
- Matched pair randomisation
- 64 referendum and 63 meeting



# Data collection



- Baseline survey
- Monitoring of processes
- Outcomes of processes
- Follow-up survey



# Are the groups balanced?



**Table 1: Balance of Pre-Treatment Covariates**

	Village Meeting	Referendum	Standardized Difference
Number of Households in Village	102	113	0.12
Size of Household of Respondents	9.73	9.85	0.02
Age of Respondent	44.04	43.64	0.03
Respondent is Formally Educated	0.71	0.71	0.00
Household is Food Secure	0.45	0.45	0.02
Source of Drinking Water is Unprotected Spring	0.28	0.26	0.03
Respondent Has Access to Electricity	0.17	0.13	0.11
Male Health Worker is Available	0.12	0.12	0.00
Female Health Worker is Available	0.09	0.10	0.04
Respondent Owns a Mobile Phone	0.17	0.19	0.06

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**Table 3: Ex-Ante Most Preferred Projects (percentage of villages)**

Panel A: Male Head of Household

Most Preferred Project:	Village Meeting	Referendum
Drinking Water	36.0%	40.8%
Irrigation	17.6%	12.0%
Electricity	18.4%	18.4%
Roads and Bridges	6.4%	4.8%
Other	33.6%	36.8%
Observations	125	125

# Results: Impact on allocations?



**Table 5: Resource Allocation Outcomes**

	Decision-Making Procedure	
	Village Meeting	Referendum
<b>Selection</b>		
Median number per village	3	3
Type		
Drinking Water	27.2%	23.6%
Irrigation	20.7%	18.4%
Roads and Bridges	28.5%	29.3%
Electricity	16.5%	20.2%
Other	7.0%	8.4%
Observations	309	331
p-Value for $\chi^2$ Test		0.69

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# Results: Impact on satisfaction?



Effect of referendum on Villagers' Attitudes		
	Male respondents	Female respondents
	Respondents disagreed with decision or action of village leaders	
Referendum	-0.016	-0.055***
	[0.013]	[0.017]
	Respondent attributes positive change in economic situation to village leaders	
Referendum	-0.0001	0.064**
	[0.017]	[0.027]
	Respondent is satisfied with work of village leaders	
Referendum	0.017**	0.007
	[.0008]	[0.006]
	Household's economic situation has improved in the past 12 months	
Referendum	0.062***	0.024
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
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Can information about local  
government performance  
motivate citizens to engage in  
civic activities?

# Theory of change



Joseph J. Capuno and Ma. M. Garcia  
*The Journal of Development Studies* 46:4  
May 2010

# **CAN INFORMATION ABOUT LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE INDUCE CIVIC PARTICIPATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE PHILIPPINES**


# Development programme



- Philippines 2002-2003
- Good Governance and Local Development project
- Develop and advocate indicators of good local governance
- Gofordev Index (GI) assesses public service needs, expenditure prioritisation, and participatory development



# Evaluation



# Field experiment



- 12 sites where the GI was generated
- Eight of the 12 randomly selected to receive the dissemination
- Random sample data collected individual knowledge of GI, membership in local organisations and participation in local projects
- 100 per site, but only 178 total with knowledge of GI



# Can we do an RCT?



- There is random assignment BUT at the cluster level.

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# Can we do an RCT?



- There is random assignment BUT at the cluster level.
- There is a small number of clusters and a relatively small number of individual observations per cluster.
- Not enough “power” for an RCT to measure statistically significant impacts.

# Why not just compare individuals?



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
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- Use the observables to predict whether a person has knowledge of GI
- Use the estimated probabilities to match “treated” to “untreated”
- Compare the outcomes across matched individuals

# Matched samples


*Can Local Government Performance Induce Civic Participation?*

(a) Combined




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*Can Local Government Performance Induce Civic Participation?*



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*Can Local Government Performance Induce Civic Participation?*





# Results: impact on membership?



**Table 6.** Estimates of average treatment effect on the treated: Impact of Gofordev Index on membership and participation

Matching method/ Control group	Number of samples		Average treatment effect on the treated	Bootstrapped Standard Error	<i>t</i> -statistics
	Treated	Non-treated			
<i>Member in local organisation</i>					
<i>A. Combined*</i>					
Nearest 1-to-1, caliper 0.1	178	178	0.393	0.050	7.85
Nearest neighbour, random draw	178	138	0.354	0.048	7.434
Nearest neighbour, equal weights	178	138	0.354	0.052	6.815
Kernel, bandwidth of 0.06	178	759	0.399	0.039	10.309
Radius, radius of 0.01	177	669	0.404	0.038	10.517
Stratification	178	759	0.381	0.041	9.354
<i>B. 2002</i>					
Nearest 1-to-1, caliper 0.1	92	92	0.228	0.071	3.234
Nearest neighbour, random draw	95	67	0.232	0.077	2.997
Nearest neighbour, equal weights	95	67	0.232	0.079	2.944
Kernel, bandwidth of 0.06	95	353	0.241	0.056	4.291
Radius, radius of 0.01	83	271	0.215	0.065	3.335
Stratification	95	353	0.226	0.058	3.876
<i>C. 2003</i>					
Nearest 1-to-1, caliper 0.1	82	82	0.585	0.065	8.976
Nearest neighbor, random draw	83	57	0.602	0.063	9.598
Nearest neighbor, equal weights	83	57	0.602	0.068	8.860
Kernel, bandwidth of 0.06	83	295	0.584	0.057	10.238
Radius, radius of 0.01	76	257	0.575	0.061	9.414
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(continued)

Can Local Government Performance Induce Civic Participation?

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# Effect of GI on membership



Average treatment  
effect on the treated

Bootstrapped  
Standard Error

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# Effect of GI on participation



Average treatment  
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Bootstrapped  
Standard Error

*t*-statistics

0.354

0.046

7.680

0.331

0.057

5.798

0.331

0.053

6.208

0.371

0.042

8.825

0.375

0.040

9.454

0.374

0.041

9.120

# Summary



- Evidence that direct democracy for project selection can increase citizen satisfaction about projects and processes
- Evidence that information about government performance can induce citizens to engage
- Example of RCT
- Example of PSM